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The aim of the paper is to describe the temporal ontology of that basic manifestation of 
social agency that is the living of life together. The distinction between states, processes 
and events is clarified. There are notions of ‘doing things together’ that fall into each of 
these temporal categories. The ontology of the state of friendship is examined as one 
instance of living life together. Friendship is a state of community between agents that is 
sustained by a continuity of processes and events that are characteristic manifestations of 
the state, some (but not all) of which are processes of doing things together. The 
continuity of processes and events involved in friendship is distinctive in lacking a telic 
point. Further instances of shared life that possess this characteristic temporal structure are 
described. It is argued that this notion of a mode of shared life cannot be recovered from 
the various kinds of temporally extended agential structures that are the ingredients of 
Michael Bratman’s work on shared agency. In so doing, I clarify the notion of a shared 
life, and make a case for the fruitfulness of approaching questions about joint action from 
















This paper takes as its point of focus the notion of doing things together.1 In sections 2 and 
3, I distinguish between some different varieties of doing things together with respect to 
the way that things in those categories occupy intervals of time. In section 4, I will go on 
to make some suggestions about how the relevant notions of doing things together are 
related, at least, when we pull focus to some very general temporal features of the lives of 
social animals, features which are manifest in the temporal ontology of a state such as 
friendship. 
 
Much of the discussion of joint action in the literature has focused on joint intentional 
action.2 The nature of such action is not the main subject of my discussion here. But in 
section 5, I compare features that emerge from the temporal ontology I sketch out in 
earlier sections of the paper with some of the elements of an account of joint action of 
such a kind; the account of shared intentional action found in Michael Bratman’s work. I 
shall suggest that there seem to be difficulties with understanding some of the temporally 
extended structures that emerge in sections 2- 4 in the terms of Bratman’s approach.  
                                                
1 This paper is a descendent of a talk given at a workshop of the project ‘Joint Practical Knowledge: Shared 
Agency and Knowledge of Other Minds’ which was held in Santiago, Chile, in December 2016. Thanks very 
much to Johannes Roessler and Glenda Satne who ran this project, organized the workshop, and for very 
helpful discussion and comments on the occasion. I am grateful to two anonymous journal referees for their 
extremely helpful comments and suggestions, and also to the participants of the Santiago workshop, in 
particular Guy Longworth, Naomi Eilan, Sebastian Rodl, and Abe Roth for their excellent comments on the 
original paper. Thanks to Hemdat Lerman and the participants of a postgraduate research seminar at the 
University of Warwick for very helpful comments and discussion. Thanks also to Matthew Soteriou for very 
helpful discussion of the ideas in this paper over a number of years. 




My main aim in doing this is not to generate counterexamples to Bratman’s work. It is to 
try to more deeply understand aspects of the ontology identified in the earlier parts of the 
paper, and to attempt to demonstrate that it may be fruitful to approach shared intentional 
action from the perspective of a temporal ontology that is sensitive to the kinds of 
distinctions between the ways that different aspects of reality occupy intervals of time. 
 
2. States, Processes and Events 
 
Some different notions of doing things together emerge from some quite general 
distinctions that can be drawn within temporal ontology. We might begin with the 
distinctions that Alexander Mourelatos (1978) draws between the categories of states, 
processes and events.3 Examples of states, or conditions, are such things as belief, or 
solidity. Processes are such things as running or walking, while examples of events are the 
sinking of the Titanic or the birth of Aristotle.  
 
The source of these distinctions is the way that these things occupy intervals of time. We 
might begin with the distinction between states on the one hand, which are non-occurrent, 
and processes and events, on the other hand, which occur. States may be present over 
intervals of time. But where a state, such as solidity, is present over an interval, it does not 
occur over that interval, but obtains. Processes and events (at least where we are talking 
about temporally extended events like the sinking of the Titanic) are necessarily extended 
over intervals of time. But by contrast with states, processes, like running and walking, 
                                                
3 The treatment in Mourelatos (1978) builds on influential discussions in Ryle (1949, 1953), Kenny (1963) 
and Vendler (1957(1967)). 
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and events like the sinking of the Titanic, do not obtain over intervals of time. They occur 
or unfold. 
 
Though both processes and events occur or unfold over intervals of time, and in this they 
differ from states, it is familiar for a distinction to be drawn between processes and events. 
The nature of the distinction is controversial, and a topic that is contested in the 
contemporary literature.4 My view is that the distinction is best approached through a 
particular kind of analogy between spatial and temporal notions of stuff, or mass, and 
particular countable objects, an analogy that Mourelatos suggests in his 1978 paper, 
though does not develop in much detail.5 According to this analogy, processes, such as 
running and walking, are temporal analogues of space-filling stuffs like gold, water and 
bronze. Process is mass quantifiable not count-quantifiable. There cannot be one or two 
running(s), at least without changing the notion of running that is at issue, in the same way 
that there cannot be two gold(s) or more than one water without changing the notion of 
gold at issue. There can be some running, more or less walking, or enough running 
(enough to make a runner tired, say), in the same way that there can be some gold, more 
gold, less bronze or enough water. Time-occupying events, such as some particular 
capsizing of the ship, or the Battle of Salamis, are completed stretches of process. They 
are concrete temporal particulars that are the temporal analogues of concrete particular 
material objects. There cannot be more of the Battle of Salamis, in just the same way that 
there cannot be more of a human being, or of a cup of coffee. Rather, events fall under 
types under which they can be count-quantified rather than mass quantified. There can be 
one or more battle or capsizing of a ship.  
                                                
4 For some different approaches to this issue see Stout (2016), Steward (2013), Crowther (2018), and the 
essays collected in Stout (2018). 
5 For an attempt to develop this analogy see Crowther (2011). For discussion of these issues as they bear on 
an understanding of the notion of ‘experience’, see Soteriou (2018). 
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On this approach, we can think of process as something that has the logic of a ‘temporal 
mass’ of which events with temporal duration are constituted, where such mass—in virtue 
of the difference in ontological category to which it belongs—is distinct from the temporal 
particulars that it constitutes. Process, as so understood, is not countable, while events are.  
 
A few caveats and qualifications are necessary. Someone who adopts this approach, I 
emphasize, is only committed to an analogy between these two notions that revolves 
around relations between notions of mass and count. The idea is not that there are no 
distinctions between entities in the spatial and temporal categories, or that events like 
capsizings of ships are to be understood as being material particulars that persist through 
time just like concrete material objects do. Second, though the claim is that process is not 
countable, it is perfectly possible to count types of process, such as running, walking and 
writing, and also to count stretches or phases of process, for example, five minute 
stretches of walking or running. 
 
3. Some varieties of doing things together 
 
In the light of this framework, it seems clear that there is no single ontological category 
into which doing things together falls. There are states, processes and events that can be 
characterized as states, processes or events of doing things together.  
 
Let us begin with states. Amongst states or conditions of doing things together might be 
such states as: friendship, cooperation, partnership, political or civic association, and more 
basic biological states such as eating together or hunting together (where these are 
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understood as ‘habitual states’, such as the state of being a smoker.6) In each of these 
cases, we are dealing with something that does not occur but obtains over time.7 Let us say 
that the general form of these ‘doing things together’ state-types is that the individual 
subjects, agents or groups related in these ways are in community with each other.8 
Different modes of community might then be individuated with respect to the way in 
which those individuals are in community, or what they are in community with respect to. 
 
Here is a simple example. Suppose that a group of wild dogs hunts together. These dogs 
are in, in hunting together, in a state of community. Specifically, they are in community 
with respect to their hunting. Being in community with respect to hunting at least involves 
some kind of a disposition. Animals that hunt together are disposed to engage in a form of 
coordinated activity directed at nutrition. Note that for wild dogs to hunt together in this 
stative sense, at some time t, does not seem to require that they are doing any hunting at t. 
It can be true of a group of wild dogs that they hunt together even though they are not 
actively hunting, for example, when they are all curled up asleep. On the face of it, a state 
of community of this kind is perfectly capable of pulling its weight in explanation. That 
this group of wild dogs hunts together might be what explains why, on some particular 
                                                
6 For classic discussion of such habituals see Ryle (1949, p.43, p.126-9) and see also Comrie (1976, p.24-
32). 
7 One might raise questions about this. Can’t friendship unfold over time? Well, a friendship might occupy a 
more or less lengthy interval of time. But that does not establish that friendship unfolds over the time that it 
exists. Again, can’t it be true that a friendship grows and develops over time, and doesn’t that show that it is 
something that occurs or unfolds. But that friendship can develop doesn’t entail that friendship is something 
that unfolds or can occur. Plants can grow and develop. That is not a reason to think that plants unfold or 
occur. 
8 The idea of individuals ‘being in community with one another’ is clearly very abstract. The substance of 
the notion of things being in community with one another is intended to emerge through reflection on 
different varieties of the state. Perhaps what can be said about the most general notion of such a state is: (i) it 
is relational; (ii) it is a state that is instantiated in virtue of individuals ‘being together’, in a way that must be 
made determinate in some way; and at least in the kinds of cases discussed in this paper (iii) it is a relation 
that depends for its obtaining, throughout the time it obtains, on a continuity of processes and events that 
occur in a way that manifests the relevant mode of togetherness. (See section 4(a) below) The content of (iii) 
should alert the reader to the fact that I do not assume that such states can be reductively explained in terms 
of specific processes or occurrences, understood independently of the notion of the state itself. That this 
explanatory interdependence is egregious is something that would have to be argued for, rather than just 
assumed.   
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occasion, all the dogs wake up from sleep together at round about the same time in the 
morning, and set out from their den, one after the other, in close formation. 
 
Even if there is a state of such a kind, doing things together is perhaps most naturally 
understood as singling out not a state but a process of some kind, or at least a family of 
types of process. For a group of animals to hunt together in this sense is not for them to be 
disposed to hunt but for them to be hunting together, in the sense that there is some 
nutritionally-directed process going on. Similar examples include singing a duet, fighting, 
engaging in a conversation, and negotiation. Each of these things falls into the broad 
category of occurrence. Such processes have temporal extension over an interval, and 
occupy that interval by unfolding or going on over that interval. But they are examples of 
process rather than of events. On the view of the distinction I have suggested the analogy 
between process and mass is the key to seeing this. Such things as hunting together and 
negotiation exhibit the connection with mass quantification that is distinctive of process 
rather than event. There can be some, or more, negotiation. There can be more hunting 
together. But there cannot be three negotiation(s) or several hunting(s) together, at least 
without changing the meaning of the noun by introducing implicit count quantifiers 
associated with events; such as ‘episodes of…’  
 
Within the category of process so understood one might distinguish further between atelic 
process and telic process (or ‘accomplishment’ in the terminology of Zeno Vendler 
(1957[1967]) Telic process is processive occurrence that unfolds towards a telic point, a 
point determined by the nature of the activity that serves as a way to determine whether 
this occurrence is a success or failure, and the achievement of which brings the occurrence 
to completion. Examples of telic processes of doing things together would be: chasing an 
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antelope off a cliff together, or the pack bringing down a sick wildebeest. By contrast, 
atelic processes are ‘pure’ processes, not organized according to a telic aim at which the 
activity is directed and which serves as a criterion of success or failure for the process. 
Examples of atelic processes in this sense might be running around together, playing 
together, circling the isolated wildebeest together, and, at least in one sense, hunting 
together. Various kinds of grammatical cum metaphysical tests, broadly inspired by 
passages of Metaphysics Q 6 can be introduced in order to characterize the differences 
between these two varieties of process. For example, where F-ing is an atelic process, for 
S to be F-ing at t entails that S has F-ed at t, but where F-ing is an accomplishment, for S 
to be F-ing at t entails that S has not yet F-ed at t. For various reasons, these tests are not 
completely diagnostic, even if they are suggestive. For our purposes, a characterization in 
terms of telic points the achievement of which constitutes success or failure will do.9 
 
Events of doing things together are complete and finished stretches of process. These 
come in different varieties. An event of hunting together, by contrast with the process of 
hunting together, is a temporal particular that is a finished stretch of hunting, say, the hunt 
that took place over two hours, over one night in November 2019, of which several 
animals were the participating agents. This event can be picked out in different ways, by 
different kinds of singular terms: the event which allowed the pack to eat well for three 
days; a particular sequence of chasings and killings of antelopes; that event during which 
the alpha male of some particular pack picked up an apparently innocuous scratch that 
became infected and led to his death. A hunting event of this kind occurs just in case there 
is some hunting together over some interval of time, which comes to an end, so that a 
                                                
9 For more detailed discussion of these issues see Rothstein (2004). For an attempt to explain the distinction 
between process and accomplishment by developing aspects of the analogy between mass and count notions 
see Crowther (2011). 
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stretch of hunting is complete. The completion conditions for an event of hunting together 
are, in this way, not restrictive in the way that those for the occurrence of an event of 
bringing down a wildebeest are. For there to be a complete event of bringing down a 
wildebeest together, there must be a stretch of telic process which terminates with the 
death of the animal, the occurrence which functions as the point of completion of the 
accomplishment. As well as events that are complete events of these kinds, there may also 
be temporal particulars that are botched, failed, bringings down of wildebeest. These 
events are complete temporal particulars in their own right, though given that the telic 
point of the accomplishment was not reached, they are mere maulings or injurings, say, 
rather than killings. 
 
4. Living life together 
 
Both the states and processes that have been at issue so far are relatively simple in a 
certain respect. Take the state of hunting together. For wild dogs to be in community with 
respect to their hunting entails only harmony in how they take on nutrition and certain 
kinds of co-ordination involved in such joint activity. But other kinds of states of 
community seem to implicate much more extensive and varied modes of practical 
engagement. Here one might single out for example, friendship, partnership, being in 
community with one’s family, being in civic or political community with others, or being 
in community with other rational beings, as members of the kingdom of ends. What do 
states of these types involve? Claims (a)-(g) set out some key features of the temporal 
ontology of such states, and of the type of process at their core.  
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(a) Recall that states don’t occur over time, they obtain over time. But though states do not 
occur over time, they obtain, and though paradigmatic states such as solidity or fragility 
do not require that anything at all occur at the time that the state obtains, the obtaining of 
some states does require that certain events or processes occur over the time that the state 
obtains.10 For example, the state of white heat necessitates the occurrence of certain 
physical processes over time; of molecular motion of certain kinds. Notions of community 
like friendship, being in community as members of a family, civic and political 
community, are notions applicable to living beings. For individuals to possess these states 
requires that something is going on over the time that individuals are in them. Let us call 
what must be going on the ‘living of life together’, or ‘living a shared life’. We can then 
distinguish between varieties of such shared life by distinguishing between living life 
together as friends or as members of a family. 
 
(b) As so understood, living life together falls into the category of process.11 It is not 
something that obtains but something that occurs or unfolds over an extended interval of 
time. Though there may be a highly temporally extended event that is the complete, many-
parted, temporal particular that occurred from the beginning to the end of a friendship, any 
such event is distinct from living life together. Living life together exhibits the 
connections to mass-quantification that a complete life does not. There cannot be three 
living life together, like there cannot be three bronze. But there can be some living of life 
together and more of it, like there can be more gold, bronze, or indeed, more running.  
                                                
10 For the identification and development of this idea about states and processes, and for applications to a 
range of issues in the metaphysics of mind and action see Soteriou (2013). 
11 This is not to imply that ‘living life together’ doesn’t have a stative reading, according to which it could 
pick out a what I have called a ‘state of community’. Particularly in the present tense form ‘live life 
together’, such a reading is natural. Rather, given the way this notion was introduced in (a), I want to just 
stipulate the process or activity reading, in order to enable me to make the relevant ontological distinctions 
clearer, and to be precise about the idea that a ‘state of community’ depends upon the occurrence of 
processive continuity of a certain kind. 
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Life lived together is an instance of atelic process rather than simply highly temporally 
extended telic process. There is no achievement external to the living of life together at 
which life lived together is aimed, such that the achievement of this constitutes a telic 
point determined by the nature of the process at which it must cease, and at which point 
we can say that such living was finished. Invoking the tests from Metaphysics Q 6 
indicates something of this kind. If, for example, Seth and Evan are living life together at t 
then they have lived life together at t. Seth and Evan cannot get half way through living 
life together. 
 
(c) Living life together can’t be finished, but it can stop. For the living of life together to 
stop requires breakdown of the state of community. Some terminations of states of this 
kind may be very clear-cut, and consist in the occurrence of very particular events. One 
kind occurs when one of the agents dies.12 Other examples of clear-cut breakdowns will be 
those in which the obtaining of the state of community between agents is partly 
institutional, and in which these states break down in individuals resigning or being 
removed from office. Non-institutional states, such as friendship, exhibit different kinds of 
breakdown. Some breakdowns of friendship are sudden and clear-cut. Roger tells Phil he 
                                                
12 I thus understand states of community as relations which are existence-entailing. Perhaps this might be 
queried. One relevant thought here, put to me by an anonymous referee, might be that a close friendship 
might survive death, and that various things that one does, after a friend’s death—honouring them in various 
ways, for example—might be explained by the persistence of one’s friendship. One might make the same 
point about love. (I take it that the thought here is that the state may not be extensional, rather than that the 
friendship or love continues to take some extensional object). I would respond that in these cases the relevant 
explanatory work can be done by affective and emotional states that were constitutively involved in the 
original relation, but which now survive independently of the relation.  
I do not think it the job of the philosopher to stipulate talk of the survival of friendship or love beyond 
death out of existence. But I do think that what survives, however meaningful, significant and action-
determining it may be for the individual, is something less than the original relation; something that needs to 
be characterized at least in part, in terms of loss. I also want to emphasize here that such remarks are 
completely independent of any commitments about the ways in which those who have suffered such loss live 
with that loss. I will always think of the friends of mine who have passed away as my friends, and of my 
deceased grandparents as those that I love. It is unthinkable to me that I should stop thinking in this way. 
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voted for Brexit. Even if Roger doesn’t know it, and even if they may still be found in the 
same pubs on the same night, things are, as of that moment, over between them. But in 
most cases in which it occurs, breakdowns of friendship aren’t normally like this. In many 
cases, friendships gradually deteriorate as the demands of work and family life shrink the 
time available for socializing. In many of these cases, friendships might survive for 
relatively long periods in degenerate forms, in which they fail to be the kinds of 
relationships that they should be, given that they are friendships. Then they either need to 
be revived or they disappear.13 
 
(d) Living life together, then, in lacking a point of completion internal to nature of the 
process, cannot be understood as telic process. And its connection to mass quantifiability 
demonstrate that it cannot be understood as an event (whether a bounded stretch of either 
atelic or telic process). However, life lived together over time can be constituted by shared 
telic processes, or events, that occur during intervals of the time that life is lived 
together.14 It may also be constituted from atelic processes that differ from living a shared 
life, and states that obtain over intervals. In general, life lived together is a kind of 
processive continuity that has such processes, events and states as constituents. 
 
Here is an example of a part of this. Suppose that Seth and Evan, who live life together as 
friends, walk home from Jules’s party together late at night, and that they finish walking 
back home together at 2am. At 1.30am they were still walking back from the party. And at 
2am an event of the type ‘a walk back home from Jules’s together’ was completed. Their 
                                                
13 See fn.17 below for further discussion relevant to these ideas.  
14 The idea that life lived together may have shared telic processes or events as ‘constituents’ I understand to 
be just the claim that such processes and events are parts of such a life. I do not take such a notion of 
constitution to imply that these parts are ‘explanatorily basic’; that is, that it is possible to reductively explain 
the notion of the living of a life in terms of the relevant parts, independently of the notion of such a life. 
Neither do I think that the nature of the continuity of processes and events required for a state of community 
of the relevant kind to obtain can be explained independently of the state itself (see fn.8 and section 4(a)). 
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walking home from the party is an instance of telic process. As such, it cannot be 
identified with the living of a shared life, which is not. Neither can the walk that is the 
temporal particular that was complete at 2am be identified with that life. Living a life is 
not a temporal particular. Unlike the telic process of walking home, and the complete walk 
that this process constituted, the living of shared life did not terminate at 2am. It persisted. 
At 2am, there was some more life lived together to come. When Evan wakes up in the 
morning wondering whether Seth’s hangover is as bad as his, and when Seth groggily 
dials his number shortly after waking, these events do not bring the state of community 
qua friends and the processive continuity of their shared life back into existence. That 
state, and that continuity, persisted through their drunken sleep. On waking, there is more 
of the same as what was going on before 2am, as they were walking home, and before 
they fell asleep. 
 
(e) When life is lived together qua friends, the processive continuity that unfolds does not 
have to consist of particular process types, say, running together or eating together. This is 
one difference from such states of community like hunting together, the individuation of 
which involves one relatively determinate shared process-type.15 Rather, life lived together 
as friends consists of processes, events and states such that the types of processes or 
events that unfold and the states that obtain over time, as well as the way that those 
constituents are ordered in time, are manifestations of the state of friendship. And such 
manifestations can belong to many different, more specific types. 
 
                                                
15 That hunting together is a state the individuation of which involves the occurrence of a single relatively 
determinate shared process-type does not entail that it does not contain, as constituents, other shared process-
types, such as walking in single file to the hunting grounds together. It is difficult to delineate precisely the 
grounds on which hunting together is a relatively determinate process-type, by comparison with doing the 
kinds of things that we do together, given that we are friends. But it nevertheless seems evident to me that 
there is some relevant difference of determinacy here, however that difference is to be accounted for. 
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It is a natural enough thought that at the core of such processive continuities are processes 
of doing things together. Seth and Evan mess around together in home economics class, 
then club together to buy some fake ids so they can go and get some drink to take to 
Jules’s party. Once they have done this, they set off to the party together. But not all of the 
events and processes that are constituents of life lived together as friends are processes of 
doing things together, like walking back from Jules’s party together. For example: Seth 
asks his mom if it is ok for Evan to sleep over. Or, Evan, who’s waiting in the cafeteria for 
Seth, tells Fogell, who tries to sit next to him, that that seat is already taken. Or, Seth gets 
excited about the mint condition Boba Fett helmet he bought on eBay, which he’s going to 
give Evan for his birthday. He imagines his surprise and delight when he opens the parcel. 
These are not things that Seth and Evan do together, in the specific sense of processes of 
doing things together. Nevertheless, they are constituents of their shared life, of the life 
they live together. And they are constituents of their shared life because they are 
manifestations of their friendship. 
 
(f) When doing things together, in the specific sense of joint process, occurs as a 
constituent of life lived together, and so manifests the relevant state of community, then it 
occurs in such a way, and against such a background, that all things being equal, it will 
happen again. When individuals share a life then their joint activities and actions occur as 
part of a processive continuity in which things are done together repeatedly. In the case of 
animals that hunt together, their hunting together, on any one particular occasion, occurs 
against the background of a form of life for which repeated hunting is the norm. When 
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animals related in this way hunt together, then all things being equal, they will hunt again. 
And they ought to, given how they are related.16  
 
Something similar occurs in the case of friendship. When friends do things together, in the 
sense of engaging in joint activity together, their doing what they do occurs against the 
background of a continuity in which things are done together repeatedly. This need not be 
understood in terms of the idea that friends always repeatedly do the very same types of 
things together—getting coffee together, gossiping about the people they dislike 
together—though many of us do. It is that when any of these things are done, as a 
constituent of the shared life of friends, it is one manifestation of a pattern, of those in a 
state of community repeatedly doing things together.17 
 
The way in which such joint activities are repeated in shared life does not involve 
continuous processes of doing things together, in the sense of gapless joint activity. 
Aspects of this temporal structure seem to reflect the fact that no matter how intimate a 
                                                
16 The normativity that I allude to here is neither moral nor rational, but natural, where ‘natural normativity’ 
involves the idea that there is an ‘ought’ determined by what kind of state (or living being, property, or 
process) something is, and what it is for it to be fulfilled or to exist in its fullest and most complete way. 
These Aristotelian ideas are, of course, controversial, and I can’t defend them fully here. For related 
applications of these notions in contemporary discussion, though, see Foot (2001) and Thompson (2008). 
17 There is a certain degree of idealization and simplification involved here. The kind of friendship 
discussed in this paragraph is ‘relatively close friendship’. In the face of this, someone might want to insist 
on a place for friendships that can survive even in conditions of geographical separation and the loss of 
contact details on both sides, in which there are no such patterns of repeated joint activity.  
One strategy here might be to maintain that these are not cases of genuine friendship. A different strategy 
might be to distinguish between degrees of friendship, and accompany this with the idea that in such 
circumstances, friendship can continue to obtain in virtue of the truth of various counterfactuals; for 
example, that one remains friends with someone with whom one has lost contact, because one would call, 
were one to discover their number, and the call would be warmly received, or, were one to stumble upon 
their email address, then one would write to them, and renew contact. I see no reason to insist on the first 
strategy, given our ordinary conception of friendship. The second strategy raises questions about how the 
relevant counterfactuals are to be constrained.  
 What I would want to emphasize in the face of cases of this kind, though, is just that they do not threaten 
the idea that the notion of repeated patterns of joint activity occupies an explanatorily central place in our 
everyday conception of friendship. Given the concession that cases of this kind involve the persistence of 
friendship, it still seems that we understand these cases, essentially, in terms of what they are not: that is, in 
terms of the idea that they are relations which involve specific kinds of departure from cases of friendship 
that involve such repeated joint activity. They are unusual or degraded forms of a basic kind of friendship 
relation. 
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shared mode of life may be, agents are embodied, finite creatures, creatures which tire and 
need rest, and so necessarily cycle through waking and sleep.18 
 
(g) If individuals live life together qua friends or qua members of a family then each lives 
his or her own life, where to live a life in that way does not entail any particular facts 
about the life of the other. So also, if two individuals are in a state of community qua 
friends, then there are a range of non-relational states that each must be in, perhaps, 
having certain values, intentions, desires, states of character and so on. I do not assume 
that it is possible to conjunctively understand the notion of living life together in terms of 
facts about two lives, plus a set of facts about how those lives are coordinated that can be 
specified without reference to a shared life, or to the state of community that is a part of 
the complex involved in shared life. So also, it is no part of the present suggestions that 
the state of community qua friends can be explained in terms of a set of facts about the 
non-relational states of each individual plus some further set of facts that can be specified 
independently of the notion of the state of friendship or of a life lived together as friends.19 
 
5. Bratman (2014) on Modest Sociality and Shared Intentional Agency 
 
I want now to look at aspects of Michael Bratman’s views about shared agency in the light 
of some of these ideas. I focus on the presentation of these views in Bratman (2014). 
Bratman (2014) characterizes his project as attempting to provide sufficient conditions for 
shared agency by providing an analysis of shared intentional action, where the primary 
                                                
18 Here the processive continuities involved in forms of friendship bear relations to other interesting 
examples of multi-agent process. A very primitive instance of this, for example, is the process of the 
preservation of a species through reproduction. Where an instance of reproduction occurs as a constituent of 
the preservation of a species through reproduction, the occurrence of reproduction at time t implies that 
there will (all things being equal) be future instances of reproduction. 
19 For further discussion relevant to these issues see Longworth (this volume). 
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targets of such an account are small-scale cases of shared action, such as painting a house 
together or travelling to New York together. The account that is offered—‘modest 
sociality’—is an attempt to demonstrate that the contents, structures and norms associated 
with individual planning agency provide a sufficient basis to explain cases of shared 
intentional action.20 
 
At the core of the modest sociality Bratman (2014) outlines is the notion of shared action 
as involving shared intention.21 For you and I to share an intention to walk together 
involves both you and I having intentions in favour of this activity, intentions in favour of 
that activity unfolding through our intention to engage in it, and through our mutual 
responsiveness to one another in walking. In such responsiveness, our having shared 
intentions thus involves a kind of ongoing sensitivity to one another and what we are 
doing; ensuring we don’t get in one another’s way, for example. It also involves you and I 
having intentions in favour of walking together by way of meshing sub-plans of the 
intention of each of us in favour of that activity, plans for the bringing off of phases of that 
activity that cohere with one another, perhaps in ways which involve flexibility with 
respect to these arrangements. A shared intention to walk together also involves each of us 
having the belief that we will perform such walking together through these intentions and 
through our responsiveness to one another, and the belief that the persistence of each of 
our intentions depends on the persistence of the other. For there to be the shared intention 
to walk together, all of this must also be public knowledge between us. Further, and 
finally, putting such shared intentions into action requires that there is an ongoing mutual 
                                                
20 Bratman argues that an approach that is conservative in this way is methodologically preferable to the kind 
of approach developed, for example, in work by John Searle and Margaret Gilbert, who attempt to explain 
shared intentional action in terms of elements that do not have application at the level individual agency. 
21 The paragraph that follows presents, in a compressed fashion, claims developed in Bratman (2014, 
chapters 2 and 3) 
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responsiveness of our intentions and actions to walk together that is sensitive to the end 
intended by each of us, that we act by way of the intentions we each have. 
 
How does the notion of shared intentional action relate to the kinds of structures of doing 
things together that have been the object of discussion in the first part of the paper?22 Let 
us concentrate on an example. Suppose a group of diplomats, representatives of two 
countries at war with one another, meet to negotiate a ceasefire in a bloody engagement 
that is wrecking both countries. Their negotiations, both sets of diplomats hope, are the 
first manifestation of a ‘relationship reset’. They have to work together to negotiate a 
ceasefire, mindful that in both countries there are conservative forces at work in the army, 
in the media, and in the population, opposed to peace and that the terms of the ceasefire 
negotiations, and its conduct, need to be able to be ‘sold’ to these nationalist elements. 
These diplomats share the intention to successfully negotiate a ceasefire, and over five 
days, that intention is manifest in a series of meetings that flexibly execute sub-actions 
that contribute towards achieving the aim of the shared intention. We can assume that the 
sharing of this intention over the period of several days entails that various events and 
processes go on which are directed at the bringing about of the end of the shared intention. 
 
Shared intentional actions, like the successful negotiation of a ceasefire, involve a number 
of different kinds of states of community. Those who share an intention are in community 
with respect to the aims of their intentions. This state of community is what guides the 
progress of the negotiations towards the achievement of the aim of the intention. The 
different varieties of mutual responsiveness that figure in the discussion in Bratman 
                                                
22 I’m particularly grateful to two anonymous referees, whose questions and comments have been very 
helpful with respect to the discussion in this section. I have also benefitted from thinking through the very 
interesting discussion offered in Satne and Salice (ms, under review), a paper which develops and applies 
ideas from Satne and Salice (2015). 
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(2014) also seem to be states of community of some kind. Responsiveness in sub-plans 
involves being in community with respect to the achievement of the aims of their shared 
intentions through flexible meshing of sub-plans involved in the achievement of the 
overall goal. A more basic kind of mutual responsiveness involves those negotiators being 
coordinated with one another physically, as embodied agents who share a physical space 
and a field for verbal communication. Agents who are related in these ways don’t try to 
cram through the same small door at the same time and they coordinate their talking so 
they don’t talk over the top of one another.23 
 
But I want to note some differences between states of community of this kind—and the 
activity and sub-activities involved in them—and those that figured in sections 2- 4. 
Claims (a)- (d) set out some key differences. 
 
(a) Earlier the discussion focussed on the community involved in personal friendship. 
Now let us take ‘international community’, or political friendship between the 
governments and representatives of the governments of different nations. If the 
negotiations just described do constitute a ‘relationship reset’ between the two nations 
then, as those negotiations proceed, the background condition of community that is 
gradually assembled, is a state of this kind.  
 
Note that this state of community is a different state from that which obtains in virtue of 
the diplomats’ shared intention to negotiate a ceasefire. For that shared intention 
                                                
23 Sleep talking is a common childhood disorder of sleep, in which there is out loud vocalization during 
sleep. Put two children who sleep talk in the same room as one another and when they fall asleep they will  
sleep talk (nonsense) together. (See Horne (2007, p.254) There is a fundamental form of mutual 
responsiveness that is a necessary condition for shared intentional activity that such co-sleeping children do 
not share while asleep, even if they are mutually responsive in such minimal ways. Such mutual 
responsiveness arguably requires being wakefully conscious, and the availability of capacities that is 
distinctive of that condition. 
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terminates when the signatories of both sides sign the declaration that indicates the 
acceptance of the terms of the ceasefire. This termination is proper to the negotiations: it is 
fixed by the content of the shared intention. The examples of shared intentional actions on 
which Bratman (2014) concentrates the majority of his attention are also of this kind. They 
are ‘telic’: going to New York together, painting a house together.24 
  
But international community and the continuity that occurs in virtue of the obtaining of 
international community, like friendship and the shared life of friends, does not have this 
telic structure. If the negotiations do succeed in establishing a ‘relationship reset’, then 
even as the diplomats have concluded their duties as signatories, that state, and the 
continuity it entails, persists. If there is international community, then there is a processive 
continuity of shared political life on which it depends. And if that is the case, then on the 
conclusion of the negotiation there is more of that shared political life to come. Unlike the 
state of shared intention with respect to negotiating the ceasefire, and like the life lived as 
friends, there is no feature of that state or of the processive continuity on which it depends 
that determines a telic point the achievement of which is the proper point of completion of 
international community. The continuity is atelic. The only thing that can bring such a 
processive continuity to an end is the breakdown of international community.  
 
(b) When activities occur that manifest states of community like friendship and 
international community in a way that meets the ideals associated with the kind of 
continuity, this implies that they will (all things being equal) occur again. That there is 
international community between the representatives of two nations who meet to negotiate 
this ceasefire implies that all things being equal they will participate in smaller-scale 
                                                
24 This is not to rule out that Bratman might hold that there are shared intentional actions which are atelic. 
For discussion of this see section (c) below. 
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shared intentional action like face-to-face dialogue and negotiation, again. It also entails 
that those individual actions and processes go on which the participants recognize are 
necessary for bringing it about that there is the repetition of such negotiation and dialogue. 
To the extent that political community does obtain, then after the ceasefire has been 
negotiated, the diplomats of each countries have work to do in creating the conditions 
whereby such a ceasefire can be built on, and further constructive discussion can take 
place. This might involve the individual negotiators finding their own ways to explain and 
sell the ceasefire in a way that is acceptable to aggressively nationalist aspects of society.  
 
But the structure of the states of shared intention and the shared activities the unfolding of 
which satisfies their aims, though, seems to be entirely neutral with respect to these 
activities being things which will or ought to happen again. It is true that in satisfying the 
shared intention to negotiate a ceasefire the diplomats had to meet repeatedly, over a 
number of days. But those diplomats do not stand to one another in relations which 
implicate themselves in a set of patterns of activity over a much longer period of time, just 
by their being in community with one another with respect to sharing the intention to 
negotiate the terms of a ceasefire. These long-range temporal commitments seem to be 
contributed by the fact that their negotiations are the gradual reconstruction of the state of 
international community. The point emerges more clearly when we reflect on the fact that 
it is possible for diplomats to successfully negotiate the terms of a ceasefire, and so 
manifest the state of community with respect to shared intention, in circumstances in 
which the negotiations are an elaborate sham—involving the same planning and mutual 
sensitivity to the shared aim of negotiating a ceasefire—directed, on both sides, not at 
international community, but at deception of their fellow negotiators. 
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The upshot appears to be that the particular temporal characteristics of the kinds of 
structures of agency involved in such things as international community between 
representatives of countries are not straightforwardly explicable as shared intentional 
states and the joint activities that occur directed at the fulfillment of shared intentional 
states.  
 
(c) There are various suggestions open to the adherent of Bratman’s view as to how states 
of international community might be accommodated within the terms of the planning 
account.  
 
Many shared intentional actions occur as parts of more complex intentional actions. Take 
the ceasefire negotiations that we have been talking about. Suppose that one part of those 
ceasefire negotiations was agreeing on halting arms productions and to the holding of 
mutual arms inspections, for two years. This, suppose, was negotiated over the first couple 
of days of the talks. (Perhaps such an initial agreement was needed to create a background 
of assurance that the ceasefire would not just be used as a period during which covert 
rearmament could take place). But by extension, perhaps there is now room to conceive of 
the negotiation of the ceasefire itself as a sub-plan of a more temporally extended shared 
intentional action or a more temporally extended project. If that is the case, then the 
termination of the negotiations does not bring that project to an end, in just the way that 
the negotiation of the halt in arms productions and the mutual arms inspections did not 
bring the project of diplomatic negotiation to a point of termination. 
 
The difficulty is to see what such a shared intentional action or project might plausibly be. 
If this larger intentional action, or international diplomatic project, has a telic point then it 
 24 
cannot be identified with the processive continuity characteristic of international 
community. If it is not a telic process or project then the most obvious candidates suffer 
from different problems. One proposal is that the atelic process in question is that of 
intending that the state of international community is maintained in existence. This is 
certainly an intention that the diplomats at the cutting edge of negotiating the cease-fire 
have, even as they fly back to their home countries upon the completion of negotiations.  
 
The difficulty with this suggestion is not that it is circular.25 It is that it does not in itself 
say anything illuminating about what the state of international community is. And if it 
does not say anything illuminating about what the state of international community is, it 
remains open, given this suggestion, that such a state of community is a form of sociality 
that plays an explanatory role with respect to joint action that competes with the 
explanatory aims of the planning theory.26 There are further questions to press concerning 
the requirements on bearers of the relevant intention. It is an application of a familiar point 
that it is implausible to suppose that the atelic processive continuity involved in 
international community requires every agent involved in such process to bear such 
intentions to maintain international community: low-level staffers and those whose 
activities provide the substance of the implementation of the diplomats’ intentions (and so 
are thereby part of the shared political life of the two countries) plausibly lack such high-
level geo-political aims. 
 
                                                
25 The question about whether Bratman (2014) intends his own account of shared intentional action to be 
non-circular is subtle, and engaging with it fully would require much fuller discussion of the nature and 
scope of the planning theory than I can offer here. Bratman (2014: 45-6) for example, suggests that he is 
happy for his account to make reference to the notion of joint activity, where such reference is a mode of 
specification of action which neutral with respect to the intentionality of the activity. He suggests, further, 
that the existence of such notions of action can be put to work in making sense of joint activities that only 
have intentional specifications. But this raises further questions. For instance, if ‘joint activity’ is not a mere 
abstraction from shared intentional action, why should shared intentional action, rather than joint activity, be 
the most basic form of sociality or shared agency? These are questions that cannot be pursued here. 
26 See section 6 below for further discussion of this possibility. 
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A different attempt to explain the case discussed here within the scope of the planning 
theory might go as follows. Many shared intentional actions of the kind involved in such 
negotiations manifest policies of various kinds. Bratman (2014, ch.7, 2004) develops a 
view according to which policies provide part of the background for such joint actions as 
shared deliberation. Policies, the thought may be, are temporally extended planning 
structures that are not terminated upon the completion of the shared intentional actions 
that manifest sensitivity to and enactment of these policies. The policies of a philosophy 
department around hiring, for example, are not terminated when a new member of staff is 
appointed. These policies are structures that have the temporal form that was characterized 
as central to a state like international community—that is, they can persist despite the 
termination of certain characteristic telic processes that they involve—but they 
nevertheless seem to be explicable within the terms of Bratman’s theory. 
 
But the notion of sharing a policy cannot be a model for international community, any 
more than it can be a model for being in community as members of a philosophy 
department. Policies about frequencies of further meetings and on the conduct of 
diplomatic negotiations can be revised consistently with international community 
continuing unchanged, as can departmental hiring policies be changed consistently with 
departments remaining in community. Having such policies is no doubt one feature that 
often characterizes such states. But it is not identical with them.27 A natural thought, a 
thought I will pursue later briefly, is that such states of community are explanatorily prior 
to those structures. 
 
                                                
27 And at least where the notion of policy retains anything of the distinctive character that it has when it is 
understood as an element of a planning theory, friendship is obviously not explicable in terms of the notion 
of shared policy. 
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(d) The two varieties of states of mutual responsiveness do not appear to be capable of 
modelling the relevant temporally extended form of community. In the case of mutual 
responsiveness with respect to sub-plans of the intentional action, this appears to be a state 
that inherits the telic aims of the sub-plans or of the intentional actions. It doesn’t outlive 
the completion of negotiations. So it cannot be identified with such a state as international 
community. 
 
The other notion of mutual responsiveness is more interesting. Understood as a state of 
community qua embodied agents and as those inhabiting a field for communication, 
mutual responsiveness shares atelic structure with such states as friendship or international 
community. Suppose you and me have been talking for a while in your office, and I bring 
our conversation to an end by saying: “OK, I will see you when you are next in”. Our 
conversation terminates, but we don’t—at least, not immediately—fall out of this kind of 
community. That this state persists is why I can say to you, just about out of your office 
door: “Oh, and just one more thing…” Or, if I hand you a cup of coffee and you take it, 
then even when that physical exchange has finished, we do not immediately fall out of 
community as bodily agents inhabiting the same physical space. I will not bump into you 
as I turn away to pick up my own cup. The completion of the joint activities that constitute 
this processive continuity does not terminate the continuity unless the completion of these 
activities occurs in virtue of, or brings about, the breakdown of the state. It is an 
interesting question, that I won’t pursue further, what the conditions for the termination of 
this state. 
 
Mutual responsiveness of this ‘bodily-agential-spatial’ kind is atelic, in being constituted 
from shared modes of activity that are atelic. That agents are mutually responsive in these 
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ways does not constitutively depend on any particular telic process or sub-activity, even if 
such processes may be part of the continuity which constitutes it. It has this in common 
with the temporal structure of friendship and international community.  
 
But though these states are similar with respect to this aspect of their temporal structure, 
these states are clearly distinct from one another. Mutual responsiveness of these kinds is 
plausibly an important component of such states, specifically, of the joint activities and 
processes that constitute the processive continuities that characterize states such as 
friendship and international community. But it is distinct from what it is a component of. 
Physical coordination of this kind, as Bratman (2014, p. 80) notes, can occur even 
between soldiers shooting at one another across a battlefield.  
 
The difference is also manifest, more importantly, in the fact that the relevant states of 
community play an explanatory role that this variety of mutual responsiveness does not. 
Mutual responsiveness of this kind is not what explains why the diplomats convened on a 
Tuesday morning at 9am after having been up working until 2am, and it is not what 
explains why, when the negotiations have been concluded, representatives of each country 
go away to pursue certain kinds of intentional actions geared toward selling the terms of 
the ceasefire to their respective countries. International community is. Mutual 
responsiveness is not what explains why Seth rings up Evan, hungover, in the morning, to 
see whether he feels as bad as he does, or why Evan gets excited by the Boba Fett helmet 







In sections 2- 4 I tried to motivate the idea that a range of processes of doing things 
together, individual actions, and events are manifestations, across an interval of time, of a 
basic form of social agency: the living of a shared life. That two individuals are friends 
can be what explains why they do things together in the way that they do, including why 
they do certain things together repeatedly over extended intervals of time, why they 
perform a range of individual actions when they are not together, and why they are in the 
affective states that they are in at various times. The state of community involved in a state 
like friendship doesn’t only function as a causal explanation of two individuals doing 
things in these ways. It is the source of various norms for the unfolding of the relevant 
processive continuity. The fact that two individuals like Seth and Evan are friends is what 
explains not only why they will see one another again after they have walked home from 
Jules’s party together, but why they ought to.28  
 
The upshot of discussion in the previous section appeared to be that the notion of life lived 
together as friends or political representatives could not be explained in terms of notions 
drawn from Bratman’s planning theory. If that discussion is right, there is a highly general 
notion of temporally extended agency that involves the obtaining of a state of community 
of a very general kind, and the unfolding of an atelic processive continuity constituted 
from events, processes and states, the character and order of which manifests such 
                                                
28 I remind the reader of that my use of ‘ought’ here is not a moral nor a rational ought, but an ought that 
indicates commitment to the teleological idea that in virtue of the kinds of things they are, states, relations, 
processes, or activities involving living beings (indeed those living beings themselves) have a ‘most 
complete’ mode of existence that determines the specific content of the ‘ought’ in each case. (See fn.16 
above). Further questions concerning the substantiation of this view about ‘ought’, as well as its relations, in 
cases of joint action, to rational notions of normativity, I will have to take up elsewhere. It is also a question 
worth exploring elsewhere whether the temporal ontology of joint action developed here has consequences 
for the epistemology of joint action. On the epistemology of joint action see the papers by Longworth, Satne, 
and Roessler, in the special edition of which this paper is a part. 
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community, that cannot be understood in terms of either shared intentions or an 
overarching plan or policy. In a community like a philosophy department, we might see 
the adoption and implementation of projects or long-term plans as constituents of the life 
the members of the department share qua members of the department. But so also we 
might see the friendly refinement, collegial renegotiation or abandonment of such policies 
as the constituents of the shared life of the department.  
 
As I emphasized at the start of the paper, the purpose of the discussion in section 5 is a 
better understanding of the relevant form of temporally extended agency, by 
distinguishing it from the kinds of structures of agency involved in the planning approach. 
Important differences, we have seen, relate to the way that things in those categories 
occupy time. Even if we assume that this is correct—and showing that it is correct would 
seem to me to depend on further work—whether this is an objection to the project that 
Bratman pursues in his writings on shared agency is a quite different question, and much 
more delicate. I want to end by saying a few things about how I see this issue, and 
flagging questions for further research and friendly dialogue. 
 
If there is a difficulty for the planning approach somewhere in the content of the 
discussion, perhaps it is this. The planning approach to modest sociality might sometimes 
seem to be presented as an account of the basic form of shared agency at work in the lives 
of mature, self-conscious, human beings.29 What it is for it to be basic is that it is 
fundamental in the explanation of the ways that we act together. But perhaps the 
discussion provides reason to think that planning agency, the notion of planning intentions 
                                                
29 See, for example, the framing discussion in Bratman (2014, ch.1). Much will turn here on how we are to 
understand the implications of the notion of a ‘basic’ form of sociality in such discussions. Is it consistent 
with such basicness that there are a plurality of such basic forms? The spirit of the introductory discussion of 
Bratman (2014, ch.1) appears to be that it is not. But the letter is, I think, neutral. 
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and actions that manifest these intentions, are not such basic elements. There is a kind of 
temporally extended structure of agency that corresponds to something like living a life 
together. It is not possible to explain the notion of shared life in terms of notions drawn 
from the ontology of planning agency. In fact, in explanatorily central cases, shared 
intentional actions, the patterns of shared intentional action over time, and associated 
individual actions manifest these relations of community and form elements of the 
relevant processive continuities. When they do so, they inherit some of the structure 
imposed by the prevailing state, and different aspects of these occurrences can be 
explained in terms of features of the state and the processive continuity that unfolds in 
virtue of it. Given this, it is not planning agency that is basic. What is basic is the structure 
associated with living life together in the relevant ways. 
 
If that is the worry, one way for the partisan of Bratman’s approach to respond to the 
discussion so far might be the following. It is true that shared life cannot be understood in 
terms of the notion of the apparatus of planning agency. It is true that in certain cases, 
shared intentional action and patterns of such action can be explained in terms of these 
states of community and the relevant continuities. But such structures are not essential for 
shared intentional action. Many, if not, indeed, most cases, of shared intentional action 
simply do not occur as part of these richer temporal structures; structures such as 
friendship or political community. They are one-off shared actions of handing over money 
to people behind the counters of coffee shops, handing passports to airline staff and 
receiving them back, and exchanges with cab drivers. Given this, these ‘community-
involving’ features of shared intentional actions are not essential to their occurrence as 
shared intentional actions. So it is not the case that the structures of shared life are more 
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basic in explanation than the notion of shared intentional action. Therefore, the existence 
of such forms of agency is not inconsistent with the planning theory.30 
 
This opens up a richer area for further discussion. Perhaps this response can be granted if 
the kinds of structures in question are the states of community and processive continuities 
involved in friendship, in the membership of a family, or in membership of a philosophy 
department. But one idea here might be that there are more fundamental states of 
community, and more fundamental varieties of processive continuity that mature rational 
human beings do stand in to one another even under conditions of pervasive partiality. 
Kantian ethics might provide one route towards identifying these structures. And 
Aristotelian metaphysical biology another. This is something for another occasion. In any 
case, I hope to have at least motivated the idea that attention to some of the distinctions 
between the ways that things occupy time, and to some of the ways in which processes, 
events and states—though occupying distinct temporal categories—may be related to one 
another in particularly central types of case, is a fruitful perspective from which to 
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